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The Missions of the Indian Navy
by
Gary L. Sojka
Introduction

S

ince the advent of the first oil crisis, the United States and its alHes have

recognized the strategic importance of the Pcnian Gulf-Indian Ocean area,
The second oil crisis. followed by the seizure of American diplomats in Iran, and then
by the Jranian-lraql War, reinforced the importance of this area in Western minds.
Along with i11creased Western interest, American and allied defense analysts began
to focus their attention on military development� within the important oil-producing
countries of Iran. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Placed equal1y high on their
agenda were the activities of such Soviet client states as South Yemen and Ethiopia.
This focus remains today and is in many ways justified, Nevertheless, it all too often
overlooks the premier littoral state in the area-India. This is unfortunate, for India
not only has the most capable armed forces, including navy. of all the littoral states, it
a1so has strong ties with the Soviet Union, having signed in 1971 a Treaty of Peace,
Friendship. and Cooperatlon, 1
In order to understand the role the Indian Navy plays in the Indian Ocean, it is
necessary to look at India's national mission, its maritime interests, and the mls�ions
and capabilities of its navy. For [ndia 's mis...ion as a nation defines its maritime
interests and, in a similar manner, India's maritime interests help to define the
missions. and c.:apabilides of its navy, But it is not simply India's national goals with
regard to its maritime interests which have an impact on its na.vy. Another factor is
India's industrial base. Also important are perceived threats to maritime interests;
and, indee<l, naval training, force deployment and capabilities, and even the
orientation of naval mlssions retlect both rhe nation's and the navy's visions of future
conl1ict.
National Mission

India 1s phy.,.kally a large country, encompassing about 1.26 million square miles,
with a coastline of roughly .1,500 miles. 2 Within its borders live .�omc 700 mHlion
people, characterized by their substantial and well-known diversity. This diversity
manifests itself in the economic, religious, soda!, and lingui,tk realms. For example,
most Indians engage in subsistence agriculture, but there is an ever-growing
manufacturing and trading sector. Hinduism, practiced by nearly 80 percent ofd,c
populatlot1, is the predominant religion; but a sizable Muslim population (11 percent)
exists, and there are pockets of Christians, Jews, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and
Zornastriaus. The Hindu caste system stratifies a large portion of the country along
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Warfare in the Fourth Dimension
ls the Navy Ready for it?
How can the Navy Prepare for it?
by

M

Lieutenant Commander G. Guy Thomas, US Navy

ost dictionaries define the fourth dimcnsmn as time, however, some military

writings refer to a fourth dimension of military endeavor beyond the three
traditional ones of sea, air and land. That dimension is the electromagnetic spectrum.
The two concepts rnay, at first glance appear to have little in common with each
other bm, in fact, they are closely related. The battle for the electromagnetic
spectrum is, in many respects, a battle for time.
RAdm. Albert A, Gallotta, a recent Director, Electronic Warfare and Cryptol
ogy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, made the point very clear indeed when
he said, "I view all battles as having a time line that can be divided into four phases: 1)
the force coordination phase. 2) the surveillance phase. 3} the targeting, weapons
direction phase i and 4) the weapon•s fusing and impact phase, i.e., the actual
engagement. Electronic warfare is paramount in the first three phases." He went on
to say that we need to get our operatfona! co_mmanders to spend more time thinking
about the first three phases of the battle, rather than spending all of their time
thinking about only the last two (targeting and engagement).'
The purpose of this paper is to define a need within the Navy for additional
thinking about 14 warfare in the fourth dimension" and to suggest how electronic
warfare could be simulated for education and training purposes at the Naval War
College to add to the readiness ofour Navy. Fleet readiness is the primary mission of
the Naval War College and its Center for War Gaming and it must be remembered
readiness is a primary requirement for any strategy involving the Navy, no matter
what its objective.
The Naval War College is acquiring a new computer-driven war gaming system,
the Naval War Gaming System, to assist in maintaining that readiness. The Naval
War Gaming System will have the capability to simulate EW alld c3 (command,
control and communications) sys.terns: but, as delivered, that capability needs further
refinement in order to accurately play EW and c3 systems. Currently the Naval
War College inputs EW into its war games by modifying rhe probability of kill (pk)
in its barrle damage assessment calculations, This method, while better than nothing,
is insufficient to accurarely measure the effectiveness of EW. A major portion of the
effectivene$sof EW is the time delays that it generates. This is true of both offensive
and defensive EW systems. War gaming Battle Damage Assessment is only a
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21
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Israel's New Military Doctrine
by
Efraim Inbar

T

his paper examines the changes in Israel's strategic thinking since 1980.
We can distinguish two stages in the development of the Israeli strategic
thinking since the 1973 war: the first in the 70s and the second starting in 1980. In the
first period, Israel perceived its political isolation and great dependence upon the
United States, which reduced its freedom of action. Furthermore, Israel needed time
to rebuild its army and its confidence. Israel lost some of its deterring power, but it
felt that its borders still provided the country a margin of security which could be
enhanced by incorporating some military and political arrangements. Demilitari
zation and tripwire arrangements were sought after.
In the first stage, the Israeli military thinking resembled the doctrine of the period
before the war. Israel continued to hold a defensive strategy, i.e., the ability to
absorb an Arab first attack to be followed by an Israeli decisive counter attack. In
order to continue the posture adopted in the 1967-73 period several improvements
were required. This meant a larger army, better equipped with defensive weapons
and deployed in improved fortified lines. There was a greater emphasis on quantities
and firepower, and ways were devised to improve the Israeli Defense Force's ability
to be well prepared for absorbing an Arab military onslaught.
In the second period, we can discern a shift from the quantitative aspect of Israel's
arms competition with her Arab opponents in favor of the qualitative aspect. In
addition, a system of casi be/Ii was reintroduced and a greater predilection for
preemptive strikes was adopted.
The two periods are indeed distinguishable not only by the content of their
military thinking but also by differing leaders, ideologies, and temperaments. Israel
was ruled during most of the first period by Rabin's Labor-dominated Government
Qune 1974-June 1977), while for most of this period the Chief of Staff was the
Labor-picked Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur (April 1974-April 1978).
In 1977, Labor was succeeded by Begin's Likud-dominated Government. In 1978,
Gur was replaced by Lt. Gen. Rafael Eitan, who is ideologically closer to the Likud.
The main changes in Israeli strategic thinking in the second period are connected
however to Ariel Sharon's ascendance in security affairs. After Moshe Dayan
resigned from his post as Foreign Minister in October 1979 and Ezer Weizman, the
Defense Minister, did the same in May 1980, Sharon became the dominant figure in
Israel's defense policy. Indeed, after the 1981 election, he was elevated from the
Ministry of Agriculture to the Defense Ministry.
In spite of the ultimate military successes in the 1973 war, the initial setbacks, the
heavy losses in material and in casualties, the deficiencies revealed in various

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21

28

War College: January-February 1983 Review

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983

29

Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21

30

War College: January-February 1983 Review

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983

31

Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21

32

War College: January-February 1983 Review

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983

33

Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21

34

War College: January-February 1983 Review

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983

35

Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21

36

War College: January-February 1983 Review

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983

37

Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21

38

War College: January-February 1983 Review

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983

39

Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21

40

War College: January-February 1983 Review

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983

41

Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21

42

War College: January-February 1983 Review

41

What the Coast Guard Needs:
Cutters That Count
by
Lieutenant Commander C.H. Hill, US Coast Guard

T

he Navy must be able to conduct sustained combat operations on a
worldwide scale. It has been given the money to build ships for that purpose,
bur it is unlikely that there will be enough people to man all the ships needed.
While the Navy can get ships hut not enough people, the Coast Guard can get
people, but not enough ships. At least, with its static or shrinking budget the Coast
Guard cannot replace its obsolete ships and meet its increasing responsibilities in a
timely fashion. Of such asymmetric problems opportunities can be made.
The Navy must both provide forces for contingencies across a wide spccrrum of
intensity and prepare itself to fight in an extended conflict.
What separates these cases is that in contingencies only active forces arc used. In
an extended conflict additional forces, including the Naval Reserve and Coast
Guard, are mobilized.
Recently, the Navy has enjoyed relatively generous funding for construction, and
plans call for more of the same. While naval recruiting and personnel retention have
been good in the last year or two, when the economy improves it is probable that
both will run into trouble. But the good years economically are the times when most
money will be available to build new ships. And paying the operating and
maintenance cost of an expanded and more sophisticated fleet while continuing
modernization will require continued sustained growth of the budget. If a less
sympathetic administration is elected the Navy will again have to choose between
operations and modernization.
There is also a conflict between readiness for contingencies and readiness for
general war in the way ships are manned and deployed. These differences are
pointedly illustrated by the frigate. Frigates arc built for convoy escort, not for battle
group operations. But, because too few destroyers are built, frigates often are
operated in their place, in an environment for which they were never intended. One
method of providing the additional forces required for a protracted conflict at less
cost is to depend on the Naval Reserve. Typically a Reserve Force combatant is
manued to only a 50 percent level by regular Navy personnel, Thus, for a price in
peacetime readiness, with the same number of regulars twice the number of frigates
can be manned for potential wartime use.
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Rules of Engagement
Captain J.

by
Ashley Roach, JAGC, US Navy

There is a very real need for greater knowledge ofRnles of Engagement on
the part of strategy and policy personnel, tacticians and operators. and even
by our civilian leaders. At present these rnles are rarely, if ever, exercised and too
few planners and commanders seek contingent approval for additional or relaxed
rules. Particularly telling is the fact that the requirement for an annual compiling and
sending to JCS of the effective Rules of Engagement is all but ignored-and few
appear to care! Why?

.1..

Definitions

Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives that a government may establish to
delineate the circumstances and limitations under which its own naval, ground, and
air forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces, 1
Under this JCS definition, ROE should not delineate specific tactics, should riol
cover restrictions on specific system operations, should not cover safety-related
restrictions, should not ser forrh service doctrine, tactics or procedures. Frequently
these matters are covered in documents called ROE.2 ROE should never be "rudder
orders," and cettainly should never substitute for a strategy governing the use o(
deployed forces, in a peacetime eris.is or in wartime.
figure 1 is a Venn diagram showing two concentric circles, one wholly inside the
other. The area o( the larger circle encompasses all those actions permitted under the
law (domestlc law and the law of armed conflict). The area of the inner cirde
represents those fewer actions permitted by the ROE.
The 1aw o( armed conflict binds the actions ofnations and their armed forces. The
United States government can, by its own action, change its ROE; international law,
however, can be changed only by interna�ional agreement or consistent practice of
nations. The law of armed conflict and domestic law are, o( course. important
influences in drafting the ROE, but they are not the only influences, ROB also reflect
the influence of operational, political, and diplomatic factors.
fjgure 21 another Venn diagram, illustrates that ROE result from a composite of
these fbur factors. We have four circles centered on different points. They generally
will be of differing diameters, since the relative influence of these four factors will
vary depending on the circumstances. The common intersection of these four circles
represents ROE. ROE then shape the force that may be used in order to achieve the
1
political purpose and thus form the plane upon which Clauscwitz s observation ( that
war is the extension of politics by other means) ls brought into focus.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21
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by
Lieutenant Commander John E. Jackson, Supply
Corps, US Navy

I

n the minds of most people, the usefulncs£ of

lighter-than-air (LTA) craft cmlcd on a rain May evening in
y
1937 when the German Zeppelin Hindenburi
(LZ-129) dramatically burn into flames and embed before a horrified crowd at the
Naval Air Station in Lakehursl, New Jersey. This w.as captured 011 film and audio
tape by the small army of newsmen who untlinchlngly recorded the death throes of
the 800-foot long airship. (n the weeks following the crash, milllons of movie viewers
around the world were electrified by the sight of the flaming Zeppelin slowly
settling to rest amid the screams of passengers, crew members, and on-lookers, Most
of us have since seen it at least once on television,
In terms of modern air crashes, the death toll was modest, a mere 36 1 hut in 1937
this was the largest number of people yet to die in a crash involving a single aircrafL
The actual cause of the disaster has never been identified, and even today the debate
continues between thos.e historians who believe the Hindenburx fell victim to anti
Nazi sabotage and those who believe narural causes (such as static electriclty or
lightning) ignited the airship's six-million cubic feet of hydrogen.
While the canse of the crash is still debatahle, the results were immediately
evident. The Deutsche Luft:schiff Reederei, the German company which operated
the giant airships, promptly grounded the Hindenburg's highly successful older
"'sistc-r,H the Graf Zeppelin (LZ-127) which was returning from a flight to South
Amerka at the time of the Lakehurst crash, The Grdf carried rite last commercial
passenger ever to fly in a rigid airship, and ended a Jong and successful career which
had seen the airship .across the South Atlantic 140 times, the North Atlantic seven
times, and the Pacific once, By the time she was retired in 1937 she had flown for over
16,000 hours, covering over a million miles while carryinf; 13,100 passengers.
Despite this impressive record, the Nazi regime feared that another crash could
f
tarnish the ..invincible" image of the Third Reich, and the Gra Zeppi4in was
permanently taken out of service and put on public display in a hangar. With the
demise of Germany's passenger-airship business, the Luftwaffe assumed control of
the last remaining operational rigid airship in the world, rhe Graf Zt'ppelin If (LZ130), which was identical In size to the Hindenbur�. Jn 1938 and 1939, LZ-130 was used
to conduct some of the world's first airborne clectronJC intelligence missions,
The Germans had become aw.are o( the construction of a number of tall towers
along the British coastline facing the European continent. Anxious to determine the
military potential of these site�. the Luftwaffe outfitted the LZ-130 as a flying
clectronks laboratory. The airship made a number of flights a1ong the British
co,1s.tline rn intercept and analyze the emission from the mysterious towers, But the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21
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The Trident System:
Submarines, Missiles,
and Strategic Doctrine

O

by
Commander James John Tritten, US Navy
n 11 November 1981, the USS Ohio (SSBN-726) was commi,

sioned, The first of the new Trident submarines, Ohio is the product of years
of research, development, controversy, and hard work. Yet Oido is but one part of a
total Trident System which includes ships and missiles, logistic support plans,
training, and basing modes.
This treatise will analyze the two major aspects of the US Trident System:
Ohio-class submarines and Trident missiles. The major issues in their development
wilJ be considered as will alternatives to each. Finally, prospects for the furure will
be examined based on the new realities of strategic nuclear force employment in a
potential contlict. The impact of the Trident System on both the US Navy and this
nation's strategic nuclear capabilities is potentially so profound that it could
fundamentally restructure the long-held triad of land-based missiles, manned
bombers. and the submarine ballistic missHe force.
The Ohio-Class Submarine

The Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is the largest
submersible ever constructed by the United Stares. Ohio is 560 ft. long. 42 ft. wide,
and displaces 18,700 tons submerged, ft can accommodate 164 personnel but will
normally be manned by two alternating (Blue/Gold) crews of 15 officers and 142
enlisted men. Each Ohio will have 24 missile tubes and 4 torpedo tubes. The
submarine was built by EJectric Boat, a subsidiary ofC':reneral Dynamics, in Groton,
Conm:cticut.
The building of a new SSllN stems from the extensive STRAT-X study
commissioned by Secretary ofDefens:e Robert McNamara in 1966. 1 STRAT-X was
to determine if the United States needed a new advanced intercontinental ballistic
missile (JCBM) and if so, how it was to be based, Nine possible systems were
analyzed including land, surface ship, and submarine-based alternatives. Over 100
various combinations of submarine-launched ballistic miss:Hes (SLBMs) on differing
submarines were considered,
STRAT-X recommended in 1967 four pos�ible options. Prom these, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) favored a plan for an Underwater Long-Ranged
Missile System(ULMS). ULMS was a logical choice since the Navy's Polaris/Poseidon
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PROFESSION AL READING
They "sensed that they had an unwritten contract with the Navy
and their officers."
by
Hugh Nott•

Mason, Theodore. Battleship Sailor. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 271pp.
$14.95

M

ore than forty years ago, on 7 December 1941, high above the explosions
and flames convulsing Battleship Row in Pearl Harbor, 19-ycar-old
Radioman Third Class Ted Mason had a ring,,.idt' seat for the stunning event that
would commit himself a11d his entire generation of Americans to four years ofsavage
war. From his battle station in the maintop of the USS California, helplessly exposed
to the strafing runs of attackingjapanese aircraft, the young sailor watched the tragic
debacle he had not known would, or could, happen, Tl1e boyish Mason was luckier
than many of his California shipmates who were sealed in the main radio spaces below
armored hatches, deliberately designed to be inoperable from bdow when Condition
Zed was set. Several of his closest frien<ls and his admired chief radioman supervisor,
awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor, did not survive.
This vividly recalled account. four decades later, mixes recrimination with
anguish and serves to remind us that the young Navy enlisted men who lived and died
that momentous Sun<lay morning may have felt as much outrage against their
leaders, who had not planned, as against the Japanese, who had. In a somewhat vague
but personal and co11ective way, Mason an<l his battleship colleagues had sensed that
they had an unwritten contract with rhe Navy and their officers, In exchange for
their obedlence, loyalty, and second-class shipboard citizenship, subject to stern
regulations and sometimes harsh discipline, they believed their more privileged
Captain Nott died on 2January. This review is the last of the many contributions
he made to the Naval War College.
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Reading
Winslow, W.G. 'rlu·Flt·ettheCods l·'orgM:
Tire U.S. ilsiarit l-'lerr in fl'orid U'ar !I,
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982.
327pp. $21.9.\
Captain Winslow's hook documents
the demi.�e of the Asiatic Fleet at the
onset of World War IL It is a hiscory of
inglorious tactical failures and planning
shnrtfalls dramatically contrasted with
accounts of personal courage, determi
nation, and heroic achievements by men
fighting against overwhelming odds.
'/'Ju, Flee/ thf' Gods hngot, ttnlikc mo�t
World War II histories, is. not a single
story chronologically following the
progress of a battle plan towards its
ohjcctive, [r is il collection of accounts
about various units of thls ilt-fatcd fleet
which, though undeniably interrelated,
arc each disrinctly different, l)Ot scpar;ttc
facet� nf a more c.:omplcx battle plan,
Thi-. h because the Asiatic Fleet could
not afford to exercise t;u:tical options
after the commencement ofhnstilities. Ir
w ;ts n·dnced to reacting to Japanese
initiatives and trying to execute a less
than organized withdrawal to safer
waters. Consequently, there was nn
overall battle plan for this story to
follow.
Part r, Operations, provi<les a thumb
nail sketch of the fleet, the tactical
environment, the numerou� cnmmandcn
and pretenders to command, the allied
forces in the theater, and a brief desnip
tion of the performance of each compo
nent by ship type and air units. Part n.
Battle Reports. is a collection of sixteen
separate stories which detail heroism and
adventure unparalleled by fiction.
The most salient quality of this hook is
its relevance to today's situation in tl,e
Western Pacific. The tmmber of parallels
is so remarkable it i.\ alannin�. The
overage and ovcrcommltted Asiatic
Fleet operated in waters now patrolled
by the Seventh Fleet. While the average

83

,1gc of Seventh Fleet ships today is
considerably less than rhat nf Admir�il
Hart's ships in 1941, today's technology
brings on ohrnlcs<:cnn more rnpidly.
The expansion of Scvcntli fleet opcra
tintls tn inclmlc a continuing presence in
the Indian Occ:•n since late t979 has left
current assets strctd1ed to near the limit
of material and logistic endurance.
Recognizing the ,Hlditional commit
ments wluch would hcfoll the Asiatic
Fleet if the world situation continued m
deteriorate Admiral Richardson, Com
mander-in-Chief, US l;lcct in 1940,
scheduled a suhstantlal reinforcement
includitig ;1n aircraft carrier, three
cruisers, and mtmernus lc.�ser vessels. Ay
May of 1941, however, the reinforce
ment was reduced to the addition of
twenty-thrt:c flet:t .mhmarint·s. Today
the nC'ed to reconstitute our naval
scrcn;zth is well rccop;uizcd, The ship
lmil.Jing program hcing championed by
Secn:t.uy Lehman will go a long way to
c,1se the burden of the Sc:venth Fleet-lj'
this ambitious pro�ram can he com
pleted.
The problems of rhc Asiatic Fleet
went far hcyon<l having too few :.hips
and their struggle to matmain an acct·pt
ahlc material conditiot1. The ..:ommand
and control organization was inadequate
for the rigon of war. The surface
combatants were ut1dcr a task force
comm;mder who was unable to am;tss ;J
force in one place adequate to confront
tlie enemy, the suhmarincs were directed
from the fleet commander\ head
quarters, and the patrol squadrons were
separately controlled by their own unit
commander. To make matters worse, if
they were to understand what other
friendly units were doing these subordi
nate commanden had m illegally copy
and decode each other's message traffic.
After the opcuing of hostilities, reorga
nization of the tlcct and attempts ar
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